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Abstract
We present new semantics for propositional default logic based
on the notion of meta-interpretations —truth functions that assign
truth values to clauses rather than letters. This leads to a proposi
tional characterization ofdefault theories; for each such finite theory,
we show a classical propositional theory such that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between models for the latter and extensions of
the former. This means that computing an extension and answering
questions about coherence, set-membership, and set-entailment are
reducible to propositional satisfiability. The general transformation is
exponential but tractable for a subset which we call 2-DT which is a
superset of network default theories and disjunction-free default the
ories. This leads to the observation that coherence and membership
for the class 2-DT is NP-complete and entailment is co-NP-complete.
Since propositional satisfiability can be regarded as a constraint
satisfaction problem (CSP), this work also paves the way for applying
CSP techniques to default reasoning. In particular, we use the taix-
onomy of tractable CSP to identify new tractable subsets for Reiter's
default logic. Our procedures allow also for computing stable models
of extended logic programs.
1 Introduction
Researchers in artificial intelligence have found Reiter's default logic [ReiSO]
very attractiveand have used it widely for declarative representations ofprob
lems in many areas, including diagnosis, inheritance networks, logic programs
and natural language Processing.
However, while knowledge can be specified in a natural way in default
logic, the concept of extension, as presented by Reiter, is very tricky. More
over, as Reiter has shown, there is no procedure that computes extensions
of an arbitrary default theory, and recent research has indicated that the
complexity of answering basic queries on propositional default logic is very
high (^2 or Ilj complete [Sti92, Got]) and even for very simple propositional
default theories, the problem is NP-hard [KS91, Sti90].
In this paper we attempt toovercome the above difficulties by introducing
a new semantics for propositional default logic which is more in the spirit of
the traditional semantics for classical logic. Our approach leads to effective
ways of computing extensions and testing membership and entailment and
to the identification of new tractable subsets for default logic.
We introduce the concept of meta-interpretations — truth functions that
assign truth values to clauses rather than logical symbols — and define when
such a truth function is a model for a given default theory. By studying the
properties of these models, we are able to show that any finite propositional
default theory can be compiled into a classical propositional theory such that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between models of the classicad theory
and extensions of the default theory. Thus, queries about coherence and en
tailment in default logic reduce to queries about satisfiability in propositional
logic.
The main advantage of this mapping is that it reduces computation in
default logic to propositional satisfiability, a task that has been explored
extensively. Moreover, our method introduces a deterministic algorithm for
computing extensions of any finite propositional default theory. Previous
algorithms [Eth87a] are guaranteed to produce an extension only for ordered
default theories.
In general, our translation is exponential. However, there is an impor
tant sublanguage, which we call 2-default theories (2-DT), that is tractable
and includes the so-called network default theories — the default-logic ver
sion of inheritance networks [Eth87a]. Another important subclass of 2-DT
comprises the disjunction-free default theories, in which formulas with disjunction are forbidden. It has been shown [GL91j that this sublanguage can
embed extended logic programs, in the sense that answer sets of the latter co
incide with extensions of the former. Thus, techniques developed for finding
extensions for 2-DT are applicable for computing logic programs as well.
As a by-product of our translation, we learn that the coherence problem
and the entailment problem for the class 2-DT is NP-complete, and the en-
tailment problem for the class 2-DT is co-NP-complete. The translation also
pro^des ageneral framework for identifying more NP-complete subclasses.
Once a default theory is expressed as a propositional theory, we can use
many heuristics and algorithms that exist in the literature on propositional
satisfiability. In particular, we show how topological considerations can be
used to identify new tractable subsets and how constraint satisfaction tech
niques can be effectively applied to tasks of default reasoning.
This paper is organized as follows: In the Section 2 we briefly review
Reiter's default logic and discuss its applicability for specifying inheritance
networks and logic programs. After introducing some necessary basic defi
nitions in Section 3, we introduce in Section 4 a new semantics for default
logic by defining the concept of a model for a default theory. In Sections
5 and 6 we show how these models can be treated as classical models of
propositional logic, and we associate with each finite default theory a clas
sical propositional theory that characterizes its models. Then, in Section 7,
we use constraint satisfaction techniques to show how our approach leads to
the discovery of new tractable subsets for default logic. Section 8 provides
concluding remarks.
1.1 Default logic, inheritance networks, and logic pro
grams
1.1.1 Reiter's default logic
The following is a brief introduction to Reiter's default logic [ReiSO], Let
£ be a first-order language over a countable alphabet. Adefault theory is
a pair A = (Z), W), where £) is a set of defaults and VK is a set of closed
well-formed formulas (wff) in C. A default is a rule of the form
where a, and 7 are formulas in C}
A default <5 can also be written using the syntax a : /?i,/?„/7. a is
called the prerequisite (notation: pre((5)); the justifications (no
tation: just(6))\ and 7 the conclusion (notation; concl{6)). The intuition
behind a default can be stated as "If I believe in q and I have no reason to
believe that one of the /?,• is false, then I can believe 7." A default a : /3/7 is
normal if 7 = /?. A default is semi-normal if it is in the form q : A7/7. A
default theory is closed if all the first-order formulcis in D and W are closed.
Theset ofdefaults D induces an extension on W. Intuitively, an extension
is a maximal set of formulas that can be deduced from W using the defaults
in D. Let E' denote the logical closure of E in C. We use the following
definition of an extension:
Definition 1.1 (extension) ([ReiSO], Theorem 2.1) Let E C C be a set of
closed wffs, and let {D.W) be a closed default theory. Define
1. Eq = W, and
2. For I > 0 = £'"U {710- : /?„/7 ^ D where a 6 Ei and
^ E}.
E is an extension for A iff for some ordering E = (^ote the ap
pearance of E in the formula for £",+1.) •
Many tasks on a default theory A can be formulated using one of the
following queries;
Coherence: Does A have an extension? If so, find one.
Set-Membership: Given a set of clauses T, is T contained in some exten
sion of A?^
Set-Entailment: Given a set ofclauses T, is T contained inevery extension
of A?^
It has been shown that default logic is a formalism powerful enough to
embed both inheritance networks and logic programs. The following two
subsections elaborate on this.
E^mpty justifications are equivalent to the identically true proposition true.
^if |ri = 1 this problem will be called Membership.
^if |r| = 1 this problem will be called Eniailment.
1.2 Inheritance networks and network default theo-
ries
An inheritance network is a knowledge representation scheme in which the
knowledge is organized in a taxonomic hierarchy, thus allowing representa
tional compactness. If many individuals share agroup of common properties,
an abstraction of those properties is created, and all those individuals can
inherit from that abstraction. Inheritance from multiple classes is also
allowed. For more information on this subject, see [Eth87a] or [Tou84].
Ethenngton ([Eth87a]) proposed a subclass of default theories, called
network default theories, as suitable for providing formal semantics and a
notion of sound inference for inheritance networks.
Definition 1.2 (network default theory) [Eth87a] Adefault theory Ais
a network theory iff it satisfies the following conditions:
1. W contains only
(a) literals (i.e., atomic formulas or their negations) and
(b) disjuncts of the form (q V;i) xchere a and are literals.
2. Dcontains only normal and seminormal defaults of the form: a :filfi
or a : A 7i A ... A where q, 3, and are literals. O
Ethenngton suggests formalizing inheritance relations in network default
theories. His translation is as follows:
Strict IS-A: "A's are always B's". Etherington suggests translating this to
the first-order formula Vx.A(x)^5(x). Since we restrict our treat
ment to propositional theories, we will translate this link to the propo-
sitional rule schema A{x)—•B(x).
Membership: "The individual a belongs to the class A". This is repre
sented by the fact A(a) (which denotes here a propositional literal).
Strict ISN'T-A: "A's are never B's". Etherington translates this to the
first-order formula Vx.A(x)—5(x). We will translate this link to
the propositional rule schema A(x)—
Nonmembership: "The individual a does not belong to the class A\ This
is represented by the fact -'.4(a).
Default IS-A: "A's are normally B's, but exceptions are allowed". This
can be represented by the default rule schema A(x) : B(x)lB(x).
Default ISN'T-A: "Normally A's are not B's, but exceptions are allowed".
This can be represented by the default rule schema A(a:) : ^B(x)I^B(x).
Exception: "Normally A's are (not) B's, unless they have at least one of
the properties C, This translates to the default rule schema
A{x) : B{x) A-C,(x) A ... A -Cn(x)/B(x),
(A(x) : ^S(x) A^Ci(x) A... A-•C„(x)/-'B(x) ).
An extension of a network default theory then corresponds to a set of
coherent conclusions one could draw from the inheritance network it repre
sents. Thus all the queries defined above (coherence, set-membership, set-
entailment) are still very relevant when dealing with network default theories.
1.2.1 Default theories and logic programs
Logic programming is a paradigm for representing programs and data in a
declarative way using symbolic logic. Originally, the language used by logic
programs was restricted to Horn clauses, but later its expressive power was
greatly improved when the use of negation in the body of the rules was
introduced. This negation was usually interpreted as "negation by default"
rather then classical negation, so that a grounded predicate is considered
false iff it can not be proved from the program. For an overview of this field,
see [KH92].
The idea behind the logic programming paradigm is that programs will be
written in a declarative way using logic and willbe independent of any specific
mechanism for processing them. Thus, programmers will be concerned only
with the meaning of their programs rather than with implementation issues.
Therefore, the meaning of the program— in other words, its semantics—
should be clear and well understood by the user.
The search for an appropriate semantics for logic programs with nega
tion has occupied the logic programming community for years. The main
approaches are well summarized in [PP90].
One of the most prominent semantics for logic programs, stable model
semantics, was proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz [GL91]. They have also
shown how stable model semantics can be generalized naturally to the cLs of
"in
and negation by default— are used.
An extended logic program is a set of rules of the form
''o * Pi,.... pm- not 9i,not j2)
where each of r,p, and qis aliteral and not is anegation-by-default operator
Stable model semantics associates aset of models, or ansiuer sets, with such
an extended logic program.
Gelfond and Lifschitz have established aone-to-one correspondence be-
ween extended logic programs and disjunction-free default theories by iden-
tifying a rule of the form (2) with the default
Pi A ... A p^ :
where stands for the literal opposite to g{^/> = -,p e^~,p _ p\ Thev
have shown that each extension of such adefault theory corresponds to an
answer set of its twin logic program. Asimilar idea was introduced by Bidoit
""" "•"~The above discussion leads to the conclusion that any algorithm that
computes extensions of adefault theory also computes answer sets of logic
""a 7 fsemantics. Furthermore, any semantics attached to a default theory gives meaning to a logic program as well.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
We denote prepositional symbols by uppercase letters P,Q,R..., proposi-
lonal bterals (e.g. P, ^P) by lowercase letters p,q,r,..., sentences by a, /3,.
conjunctions of literals by d,d, and disjunctions of literals (clLs^ by
" denoted by A. The set of aU resolvents oftwo clauses ci,C2 will be denoted by res(c,,C2). The resolution closure of a
set of clauses Tis the set obtained by repeatedly resolving pairs of clauses
of T and adding the resolvents to T until a fixed point is reached
Asentence is in a conjunctive normal form (CNF) iff it is a conjunction of
clauses. Asentence is in disjunctive normal form (DNF) iff it is a disjunction
of conjunctions of literals. Each sentence has equivalent sentences'* in CNF
and DNF. The function CNF{a) (Di\F{a)) returns a sentence in CNF (DNF)
that is equivalent to a. When convenient, we will refer to a clause, a sentence
in CNF, and a sentence in DNF as a set of literals, a set of clauses, and a set
of conjunctions of literals, respectively.
A prepositional theory (in brief, a theory) is a set of prepositional sen
tences. An interpretation for a theory T is a pair (5, /) where 5 is the set of
atoms used in T and / is a truth assignment for the symbols in 5. A model
for T is an interpretation that satisfies all the sentences in T. THa means
that Q is propositionally provable from premises T, and T^q means that T
entails q, that is, every model of T is a model for a as well. In propositional
logic, Ti-Q iff r^Q. Hence we will use these notations interchangeably.
The relation < between interpretations is defined as follows: dx < $2 iff
the set of symbols to which 9i assigns true is a subset of the set of symbols
to which 02 assigns true. An interpretation $ is minimal among a set of
interpretations I iff there is no ^ ^ in / such that 0' < 6.
The logical closure ofa theory T, denoted T*, is the set {uj|ri-aj}. How do
we compute the logical closure of a theory T? Since the closure is an infinite
set, it is obvious that we cannot compute it explicitly. However, when the
theory is finite, we can compute a set that will represent the closure by using
the notion of prime implicants as presented by Reiter and de Kleer [RdK87].
Definition 2.1 A prime implicant of a set T of clauses is a clause c such
that
1. T^c and
2. there is no proper subset d of c such that T^d. •
The prime impliciints of a theory T will be denoted by PI{T). As Reiter
and de Kleer note, a brute force method of computing PI(T) is to repeatedly
resolve pairs of clauses of T, add the resolvents to T, and delete subsumed
clauses, until a fixed point is reached There are some improvements to that
^Two sentences a, 0 are equivalent iff a ^ and |= o.
'It is clear that this method will not generate all the tautologies, but these exceptions
are easy to detect and handle.
method (see for example [MR72J), but it is clear that the general problem is
NP-hard since it also solves satisfiability. Nevertheless, for special cases such
as size-2 clauses, the prime implicants can be computed in O(n^) time.
Throughout the paper, and unless stated otherwise, we will assume w.l.g.
that all formulas we use in default theories are in CNF, Wis aset of clauses!
the conclusion of each default is a single clause, and each sentence in the
justification part of a default is consistent^.
3 Propositional Semantics for Default Logic
An extension is a belief set, that is, it is a set of formulas that are believed to
be true. Asingle classical interpretation cannot capture the idea of a belief
set. In other words, we cannot in general represent a belief set by a single
model by identifying the set of all formulas that the model satisfies with the
belief set. The reason is that a classical interpretation assigns a truth value
to any formula, while an agent might not be able to decide whether a piece
of information is true or false, namely, whether a sentence or its negation
belongs to the agent's set of beliefs.
We propose to use meta-interpretations to represent belief sets. In meta-
interpretations we assign truth values to clauses rather then to propositional
atoms, with the intuition that a clause is assigned the truth value true iff it
belongs to the belief set. If both P and are not in my belief set, they will
both be assigned false by the meta-interpretation that represents my belief
set. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 3.1 (meta-interpretation) Let Cbe aset ofpropositional sym
bols. A meta-interpretation 0 over C is a pair {SJ), where S is a set
of clauses over C and f is a classical propositional interpretation for the
set of symbols Cs = {Ic\c € S]'. That is, f is a function from Cs into
{true, false}. A clause belonging to S will be called an atomic clause. •
We are usually interested in a belief set of a rational agent. If such
an agent has the clause c in her belief set, she will automatically have all
supersets of this clause in her belief set, since these are trivial consequences of
®Note that if adefault has an inconsistent justification we can simply ignore it.
We chose this notation because intuitively, = true means that c is In the belief set.
c. Hence, in order to keep the size of the meta-interpretations as manageable
as possible, we can assume that if a clause is assigned the value true in the
meta-interpretation, then it is as if all its supersets were assigned true. In
the same spirit, an arbitrary formula will be considered true iffall the clauses
in one of its conjunctive normal forms are true. These ideas are summarized
in the following definition, in which we state when a meta-interpretation
satisfies a formula.
Definition 3.2 (satisfiability) A meta-interpretation 9 = {S,f) satisfies
a clause c c) iff either c is a tautology in classical propositional logic
or there is an atomic clause c' C c such that f (/^) = true. A meta-
interpretation $ = {S,f ) satisfies the sentence Ci Acj A... ACn Ci ACj A
...ACn) ifffor all I < i < n c,. .4 meta-interpretation satisfies a sentence
s in propositional logic iff it satisfies CNF(s). •
Note that this definition of satisfiability has the desirable property that
it is not the case that, for a given .sentence s, s iff
Example 3.3 Consider the meta-interpretation M2 in Table 1.
M2)^P, A/2^-P. •
In classical propositional logic, an interpretation for a theory is an assign
ment of truth values to the set of symbols that are used by the theory. In
analog to the classical case, we now define which meta-interpretation will be
considered an interpretation for a default theory. Meta-interpretations assign
truth values to clauses, not to atomic symbols. So the question is whichset of
clauses should be represented as atomic symbols in our meta-interpretation.
We suggest that it will be a set of clauses that contains all the prime im-
plicants of any possible extension, because this way we can make sure that
each clause in the extension will be representableby the meta-interpretation.
Hence the following definitions:
Definition 3.4 (closure) Let A = [D, W) be a default theory. We will say
that a set of clauses S is a closure of A iff S is a superset of all prime
implicants of any possible extension of A. O
Definition 3.5 (interpretation)
Let A be a default theory. An interpretation for A is a meta-interpretation
(5,/ ), where S is a closure of A.O
It is easy to find a closure Sof a given a default theory A = (O, W). We can
choose S to be the set of all clauses in the language of A, for example, or the
resolution closure of VK union the set of all conclusions of defaults from D.
However, in general, we would like the size of S to be small. We can show
that the set prime(A), defined below, is a closure of A.
Definition 3.6 (prime(A)) Given a default theory A = {D,W), we first
define the following sets:
Cd is the set of all conclusions^ of defaults in D, that is,
Cd = {c|a : 3x € D)
/)(A) is the resolution closure ofCd and PI{W) with the restriction that no
two resolvents are from P[{W).
We can now define pnme(A); Let A = {D,W)be a default theory. The set
prime{A) is the union of /?(A) - {A} and PI{W). •
Proposition 3,7 (prime(A) is a closure) Let A be a default theory. pr»mc(A)
is a closure of A. •
Example 3.8
Consider the following default theory:
D={A: PjP, : A/A, : -A/-A},
W= {-^PVB}.
PI(W) = {^P VB}, Cd = and piAo) = P/(W)UCdU{B, A}.
Therefore, prime(A) = {~>P VB, B, A, ->A, B).
As we will see later, this theory has two extensions:
Extension 1 (El): {A,B, B}'
Extension 2 (E2): {-•A,-"BvB}*
and indeed prime(A) is a superset of all prime implicants of B1 and E2.
We now want to build an interpretation (S,/) for A. For reasons to
be explained later, we will choose S to be prime(A)U{-«B}. So we get
Ib I^p
Ml T F T T
M2 F
A/3 F
F F F
T T F
Table 1: Three meta-interpretations
~ • Since |£g| = 6, we have 2® different
interpretations over this fixed S. Table I lists three of them. •
In classical propositional logic, a model for a theory is an interpretation
that satisfies the theory. The set of sentences satisfied by the model is a set
that is consistent with the theory, and a sentence is entailed by the theory if
it belongs to all of its models. In the same spirit, we want to define when an
interpretation for a default theory is a model. Ultimately, we want the set
of all the sentences that a model for the default theory satisfies will be an
extension of that default theory. Ifwe practice skeptical reeisoning, a sentence
will be entailed by the default theory if it belongs to all of its models.
Since each is supposed to represent an extension that is a deductively
closed theory, each model for a default theory is required to have theproperty
that if a clause c follows from a clause c' and is true, then /c will be true
too. Formally,
Definition 3.9 (deductive closure) A meta-interpretation $ —(5,/) is
deductively closed iff it satisfies:
1. For each two atomic clauses c,c' such that cC cf, if f (Ic) = true then
/(/^) = true.
2. For each two atomic clauses c,F, iff (Ic) = true and /(/^) = true
then then ^1% rcs(c,</). •
A model of a default theory will also have to satisfy each clause from W
and each default from D, in the following sense:
®Note that we have assumed that the conclusion ofeach default isa single clause.
Definition 3.10 (satisfying a default theory) Ameta-inlerpretation 0ssit-
ishes a given default theory A iff
I. For each c 6 W, c.
For each default from D, if 9 satisfies its preconditions and does not
satisfy the negation of each of its justifications, then it satisfies its con
clusion. •
Finally, we would also like every clause that the model satisfies to have a
''reason" to be true:
Definition 3.11 (being based on a default theory) Ameta-interpretation
9 IS based on a default theory A iff, for each atomic clause c such that c,
at least one of the following conditions holds:
1. c is a tautology.
2. There is an atomic clause cy such that Ci Cc and cj.
3. There are atomic clauses ci, C2 such that 9^ Ci,C2 and c€ res(c,,C2).
4- ce w.
5. There is a default a : 3i,...,3n/c in D such that a, and for each
I < i < n •
Example 3.12 Consider the following default theory A:
W={}
D= ^
Q •
Clearly, {Q} is a closure of A, and the meta-interpretation 0 that assigns
true to the clause Q is an interpretation for A. Note that 0 satisfies A but
it is not based on A. Indeed, the set {Q}' is NOT an extension of A. •
We first define when a meta-interpretation is a weak model for a default
theory A. As we will see later, for what we call acyclic default theories, every
weak model is a model.
Definition 3.13 (weak model) Let A 6e a default theory. A weak model
for A is an interpretation 0 for A such that
1. 0 is deductively closed,
2. 0 satisfies A. and
3. 0 is based on A.
In general, however, weak models are not models of a default theory,
unless each clause that they satisfy has a proof where a proof is a sequence
of defaults that derive the clause from W.
Definition 3.14 (proof) Let A = [D^V) be a default theory, and let 0 be
an interpretation of A. A proof of a clause c w.r.t. 0 and A is a sequence of
defaults such that the following three conditions hold:
1. cE (H^U{conc/(^i),.... conc/((5n)})".
2. For all I < i < n and for each l3j Gjust(8i), the negation of is not
satisfied by 0.
3. For all \ <i <n pre{Si) C (l-KU{conc/(<5i),co7ic/(^,_i)})*.
Definition 3.15 (model) Let A be a default theory. A model for A is a
weak model 0 for A such that each atomic clause that 0 satisfies has a proof
w.r.t. 0 and A.
Our central claim is that if a meta-interpretation is a model for a default
theory A, then the set of all sentences that it satisfies is an extension of A,
and vice versa. Formally,
Theorem 3.16 (model-extension)
Let A be a default theory. A theory E is an extension for A iff there is a
model 0 for A such that E = s}. •
This theorem suggests that given a default theory ^ = (D,W) we can
translate queries on this theory to queries on its models as follows: A has
an extension iff it has a model, a set T of sentences is a member in some
extension iff there is a model for A that satisfies T, and T is included in
every extension iff it is satisfied by every model for A.
Example 3.17 (Example S.S continued)
Ml and M2 are models for A. The set of sentences that Ml satisfies is equal
to El. The set of sentences that M2 satisfies is equal to E2. M3 is not a
model for A. because A/2 is a model and A/2 < M3. •
The idea behind the definition of a proof is that each clause that the
model satisfies will be derivable from \V using the defaults and prepositional
inference. An alternative way to insure this is to assign each atomic clause an
index that is a non-negative integer and require that if this clause is satisfied
by the meta-interpretation, the clauses used in its proof have a lower index.
Clauses from PI{W) will get index 0, and this way the well-foundedness
of the positive integers will induce well-foundedness on the clauses. The
following theorem conveys this idea. Elkan [Elk90j used the same technique
to insure that the justifications supporting a node in a TMS are noncircular.
Theorem 3.18 (indexing and proofs) A weak model $ = (SJ) for A is
a model for A iff there is a function p : S—>N'^ such that for each atomic
clause c the following conditions hold:
1. ceW iffp{c) = 0.
2. If \V then at least one of the following conditions hold:
(a) There is a default S= a : •.,/3n/c GD such that $ sa^ts^es a
and does not satisfy any of^lli and, for ail cj € CNF{a), there
is an atomic clause c^ C ci such that p(c2) < p{c).
(h) There are two atomic clauses Ci and Cj such that c is a resolvent
ofCi and C2, 6 satisfies Ci and C2, and p{ci}yp(c2) < p{c).
(c) There is d C c such that E and p{cl) < p(c).
'Pvfc
Figure 1: Dependency graph
The above theorem is very useful in proving that for what we call acyclic
default theories every weak model is a model for A.
Acyclicity is defined as follows;
Definition 3.19 (dependency graph) Let A be a default theory and S a
closure of A. The dependency graph of A w.r.t. S, Gac, is defined as
follows:
1. For each c e S there is a node in the graph.
t There is an edge from node c to node (f iff <f ^ Wand at least one of
the following conditions hold:
(a) cCd
(h) There is a clause c" 6 S such that d € res(c,c"),
(c) There is a default a : in D and a.
Adefault theory A is acyclic w.r.t. a closure S iff is acyclic. •
Hence, if Ais acyclic w.r.t. 5, the order that g induces on S satisfies
the conditions of Theorem 3.18. So we can conclude the following:
Theorem 3.20 (models for acyclic theories) If 9 = (5,/) is a weak
model for an acyclic default theory A, then $ is a model for A. •
Example 3.21 (example 3.S continued) The dependency graph ofAis shown
in Figure I. A is acyclic w.r.t. S. •
We can also show that every model for a default theory is a minimal we&k
model.
Theorem 3.22 (minimality of models) Every model of a default theory
A is a minimal weak modelfor A.
For meta-interpretations over a fixed set of atomic clauses, minimality is
defined w.r.t. the following partial order; 9 <$' \W the set ofatomic clauses
that 6 satisfies is a subset of the set of atomic clauses that 9' satisfies. We
will say that 9 is minimal among a set of meta-interpretations I iff there is
no 0 ^ 0 in / such that 9' < 9. Given a default theory A and a closure of
A, S, an interpretation (S,^) is minimal iff 9 is minimal among the set of all
meta-interpretations over S.
4 Expressing an Acyclic Default Theory as
a Prepositional Theory
An interpretation (S, /) for a default theory A may be viewed as a classical
interpretation over S, where each clause in S is treated as a prepositional
symbol. Our next task is to identify those classical interpretations that are
models of A by constructing a propositional theory that they satisfy (in the
classical sense). In this section we will concentrate on acyclic default theories.
Given a finite acyclic default theory A and a closure of A, S, we will show
a propositional theory g that characterizes these models: U{Cs,f) is a
classical model for that propositional theory, then (S,/) is a model for A;
and, vice versa, if (S, /) is model for A, then {jCs^ /) is a classical model for
^A.S* section we will generalize this approach for the class ofall
finite default theories.
We will first demonstrate our method with an exeimple.
Example 4.1 (example 3.8 continued)
Consider the default logic A in example -3.8. A is acyclic. For this theory
^A.S is the following set ofsentences:
Ib-
i^p\/B' A ^[-,p-
^A La-
Ib—^^P A I^PwB^
-*^-PvS, Ip A /-,pvB *Ib
^I^A *Ia^ ^Ia
•^Ia, Ip—^IaA^I^p,
The first group of sentences expresses the requirement that a model for A
must be deductively closed. It says that if one of B or -^P is true in the model
then V B should be true too, since B and ->P are subsets of -^P V B.
Similarly, since 5 is a resolvent of ^P V B and P, if both of them are true
then B must be true too. Note that we do not have, for example, the sentence
I-,Q A I^pvB—»/-.F since -'B does not belong to S at all.
The second group of sentences expresses the requirement that the model
should satisfy A. For example, since ^PV B belongs to W, the first sentence
in the second group says that ^PM B must be true; since we have the default
/I : P/P in A. we add the second sentence in the group, which says that if
A is true in the model and --P is not, then P should be true in the model.
The third group of sentences says that a model for A should be based
on A. For example, since the only way to add A to an extension is to use
the default : A/A in A, the first sentence in this group says that if A is true
in the model, then the model must not satisfy otherwise the default
: A!A could not be activated; since no combination of formulas from W and
consequences of defaults in A can derive --P (except -^P itself), -"P will not
be in any extension, so § includes the sentence -"/-.p.
The reader can verify that M1 and M2 are the only models of g. Ifwe
look at A/1 and A/2 as meta-interpretations, we see that the set of sentences
that A/1 satisfies is equal to the extension PI and the set of sentences that
A/2 satisfies is equal to the extension P2.D
Before presenting the translation algorithm, some assumptions and defini
tions are needed. From now on we will assume that S contciins all the clauses
that appear in A, including clauses that appear in the CNF of the negation
of each justification. We will also need the following notational shortcuts:
For a given A and a closure of A, 5, we will define the macros in() amd
consQ which translate sentences over C into sentences over -Cg. Intuitively,
m(a) says that a is satisfied by the interpretation, that is, for each clause c
in CNF{a)^ there is an atomic clause d such that P is a subset of c and /^
is true. in{a) is defined as follows:
1. If Q is a tautology, then in{a) = true.
2. If Q is an atomic clause c that is not a tautology, then in{a) = Ic.
3. If a is not an atomic clause c and is not a tautology, then m(Q) =
^c' is atomic,c'cc^c'"
4. If Q = Ci A ... A Cn, then ?/?(a) = Ai<,<nm(c,)
5. If Q is not in CNF, then in{a) = in{CNF{a)).
The function cons{l3) is defined using the function in(). Intuitively,
cons(/3) means that the negation of 3 is not satisfied by the interpretation.
cons() is defined as follows:
cons{3) —•~'[m(-'/?)].
The algorithm shown in figure 2 compiles a given finite prepositional
default theory A and a closure of A. S, into a prepositional theory,
that characterizes the models of A. The appealing features of g are
summarized in the following theorems.
Theorem 4.2 Let A be a finite acyclic default theory. 9 is a classical model
for V^ ^ iff (6, f ) is a model for A. •
Theorem 4.3 Let A be a finite acyclic default theory. Suppose g is sat-
isfiable and6 = (5, / ) is a classical model for g, andlet £ = {c|c € 5, c}
Then
1. E contains all its prime implicants.
2. E' is an extension of A. •
5 Translating Cyclic Default Theories
So far we have shown that for any finite acyclic default theory A eind a closure
of A, 5, we can find a prepositional theory, ^ ~
is a classical model for ^^g> then ^ is a model for A. In this section
we will generalize this result for default theories that might have cycles.
This will imply that for any finite default theory, the questions of coherence,
membership and entailment reduce to solving prepositional satisfiability. We
Algorithm TRANSLATE-1
begin:
1. 7>a.S=®
2- PA.S=^A.S + {^c[c€Vn
^A.S = ^A.S+ { m(a) Aco7i5(,^i) A... Acona(/?n)—^Ic I a : Pi,...,/3n/c e D }
^A.S = ^A.S + —(c2 I Ci,C2 € S, ci c C2 }
®* ^A,S ~ ^A.S + { ^ci A/c3 — /c3 IC1,C2,C3 € S, and C3 e r€5(ci,C2)}
6. For each atomic clause c, define:
•^c = { Ci j c, ci € S and Ci C c }
-ftc = {(ci,C2) i C1,C2 6 S,c = re5{ci,C2)}
Dc= {{a,01 0^)\a:0i ;3„/c € i? }
SUBSET-reasons(c)= [Vcigs^ ^"(^1) ]
RESOLUTION-reasons(c)= [V(c,.c3)€fle[*n(ci) A»n(c2)]]
DEFAULT-reasons{c)= /3„)€Dc Acons(0x) A... Acona(/3„)]]
7. For each atomic clause c ^ VF, if 5cU-^cU-^c = 0,
then g = {/c—^false} ;
else s =Pa,S +
{/c—•[SUBSET-reasonslc)
VRESOLUTION-reasons(c)
VDEFAULT-reasons{c)j}
Figure 2: An algorithm that translates an acyclicdefault theory into a propo-
sitional theory
will use Theorem 3.18, which suggests the use of indices to verify that the
interpretations are grounded in the default theory.
When finite default theories are under consideration, the fact that each
atomic clause gets an index and the requirement that an index of one atomic
clause will be lower than the other's can be expressed in prepositional logic.
Let #cstand for 'The index associated with c", and let [#ci < #02] stand for
The number associated with Cj is less than the number associated with cj".
We use these notations as shortcuts for formulas in propositional logic that
express these assertions (see appendix). Using these new index variables and
formulas, we can now express the conditions of theorem 3.18 in propositional
logic over the language 6 £5} a way similar to the
translation in algorithm TRANSLATE-1.
The size of the formulas #c and [^Ci < ^^02] is polynomial in the range
of the indices we need. Note that we do not have to index all the clauses in S.
We examine If a clause appearing in a prerequisite of a default is not
on a cycle with the default consequent, we do not need to enforce the partial
order among these two clauses. Indices are needed only for clauses that reside
on cycles in the dependency graph. Furthermore, since we will never have to
solve cyclicity between two clauses that do not share acycle, the range of the
index variables is bounded by the maximum number of clauses that share a
common cycle. In fact, we can show that the index variable's range can be
bounded further by the maximal length of an acyclic path in any strongly
connected component in g.
The strongly connected components of a directed graph are a partition
of its set of nodes such that for each subset C in the partition and for each
x,y e C, there are directed paths from j to y and from j/ to x in G. The
strongly connected components can be identified in linear time [Tar72). Note
that if the default theory is acyclic, we do not need any indexing. This was
also implied by Theorem 3.20.
We summarize all the above discussions by giving aji algorithm for com
puting ^ for a given finite default theory A and a given closure of A, S.
In addition to the one-place macro in(}, the algorithm uses a two-place macro
in(Q:,c) which means q is true independently of c", or, in other words, "o
is true, and, for each clause € o, if c and cf are in the same component in
the dependency graph, then the index of d is strictly lower then the index of
Algorithm TRANSLATE-2, step 6
6. For each atomic clause c. define:
i € S and Ci C c }
= {(ci,C2) I Ci,C2 e S,c e res(ci,C2)}
= {(f>i/3i,"M/37») i o ; i3i,...,i3n/ce D }
SUBSET-reasons(c)= in(ci,c) ]
RESOLUTION-reasons(c)= [V(c,.c2)€fljm(cx,c) Am(c2,c)]]
DEFAULT-reasons(c)=
0n)£Dc [m(a,c) Acons{0i) A... Acons{^n)]]
Figure 3: Step 6 of algorithm TRANSLATE-2
The function m(Q,c) is defined as follows®.
1. If a is a tautology, then in{Q,c) = true.
2. If Q = c' where c' is a clause not in the same component in the depen
dency graph as c, then «n(Q,c) = 7^/.
3. If Q = c' where c' is a clause in the same component in the dependency
graph as c, then m(o,c) = [7^/ A(#c' < #c]].
4. If Q = Ci A... Ac„, then in(Q,c) = Ai<j<nii(ci,c)
5. If a is not in CNF, then m(Q,c) = m(CIVF(a),c).
Except for Step 6, which is shown in Figure 3, algorithm TRANSLATE-2
is identical to algorithm TRANSLATE-1.
The following theorems summarize the properties of our transformation.
In edl ofthese theorems, g is the set ofsentences resulting from translating
a given finite prepositional theory A and a closure of A, S, using algorithm
TRANSLATE-2.
®Note that m(a, c) is undefined when c or a contains a non-atomic clause, but that is
not problematic since we will use it only when this situation docs not occur.
Theorem 5.1 Let be a default theory. Suppose g is satisjiable and $
IS a model for V^g, and let E = {c\c is atomic,0 b /').
Then:
1. E contains all its prime implicants.
2. E' is an extension of il. Q
Theorem 5.2 For each extension E'fora default theory A, there is a model
0for V^ g such that a clause c is in E' iffO^ c. •
These two theorems suggest a necessary and sufficient condition for the co
herence of a finite prepositional theory:
Corollary 5.3 Adefault theory Ahas an extension iffP^g is satisfiable.
Corollary 5.4 Aset of clauses T is contained in an extension of a default
theory Aiff there is a model 9for g such that for each c^ T, $^ en(c).
Corollary 5.5 Aclause c is in every extension of a default theory^ iff each
model e for P^ g satisfies in{c), in other words, iffP^ g |= m(c). •
These theorems suggest that we can first translate a given finite prepo
sitional theory A to g and then answer queries as follows: To test
whether A has an extension, we test satisfiability of to see whether
a set T of clauses is a member in some extension, we test satisfiability of
^A,S + € r}; and to determine whether T is included in every
extension, we test whether P^^ entails the formula [Acer2n(c)].
5.1 Complexity considerations
Clearly, the transformation presented above is exponential in general. How
ever, there are tractable subsets. For example, if the default theory is what
we call a 2-default theory (2-DT), then the transformation can be done in
polynomial time and the size of the propositional theory produced is polyno
mial in the size of the default theory. The class 2-DT is defined bellow. Note
that this class is a superset of network default theories and logic programs
("disjunction-free default theories").
Definition 5.6 A 2-default theory (2-DT) is a propositional default theory
A where all the sentences in W are in 2-CNF and, for each default a :
3nll D, Q is in d-C.VF, each 3, is in 2-DNF, and 7 is a clause of
size 2. •
A step-by-step analysis of the complexity of algorithm TRANSLATE-2
for a default theory A = (D, IK) that belongs to the class 2-DT is shown
below.
Let n be the number of letters in £, the language upon which A is built,
and let d be the maximum size of a default (in number of conjuncts or
disjuncts in the formulas appear in it). We assume that 5, which is the
closure of A, is the union of prime(A), the set of all clauses appearing in
A, and the set of all clauses that appear in the CNF of all negations of
justifications'^ . Note that S can be computed in 0{n^ \D\ *d) steps (see
algorithm in appendix). We denote by I the length of the longest acyclic
path in any component of g, by dc the maximal size of and by r,
the maximal number of pairs of clauses in S that yield the same clause when
resolved. Note that r < n. p denotes the maximum number of clauses
that appear in any prerequisite and reside on a cycle on the dependency
graph (note that p is smaller than d and smaller or equal to the size of any
component in the dependency graph, so p < mm(d, n)).
step 2 Takes O(n^) time. Produces no more than O(n^) sentences of size 1.
step 3 The reason we require the justification to be in 2-DNF is that we can
transfer the negation of it into a 2-CNF representation in linear time.
We get that this step can be done in time 0{\D\*d) time and produces
\D\ sentences of size 0{d).
step 4 Takes O(n^) time. Produces 0(n^) sentences of size 2.
step 5 Takes O(n^) time. Produces O(n^) sentences of size 3.
steps 6-7 For this step, we first have to build the dependency graph of A
with respect to S. This takes 0(n^ -f |D| * d) time. We assume that
at the end of the graph-building phase, there is a pointer from each
'°Note that the justifications are in 2-DNP, and hence their negation translates very
easily into a 2-CNF.
clause to its component and to all the defaults for which the clause is
a conclusion.
For each clause c in S, the size of Sc is < 2 , the size of Rc is 0(r),
and the size of Dc is 0{dc). Computing m(c',c) takes 0(/^) time and
produces a sentence ofsize 0(/^); computing m(a, c) takes 0{l^*p) time
and produces a sentence of size 0{P *p). Therefore, for each clause c,
computing SUBSET-reasons takes 0{F) time and produces a sentence
of size Computing DEFAULT-reasons takes 0{dc * (d + pl^))
time and produces a sentence of this size. Computing RESOLUTION-
reasons takes 0{n) time and produces a sentence ofsize 0(r). Since we
have 0{n'^ ) clauses, the whole step takes + n)-^\D\*{d +pl^))
time and produces 0{n'^ ) sentences of size 0{max(dc * {d + p/2),r)).
Note that max{dc * (d + p/^), r) < dc * (d+ nP).
Proposition 5.7 For 2-DT, the above transformation takes 0{n'^ {F d- n) +|£>|*(dd-p/2)) time and produces 0{n'^ ) sentences ofsize 0{dc*{d + nF). •
The above theorem shows that there is a direct connection between the
complexity of the translation and the cyclicity of the default theory trans
lated, since for acyclic theories / = 1.
For disjunction-free default theories we have a lower upper bound:
Proposition 5.8 For disjunction-free default theories, the above transfor
mation takes 0{\W\-\-\D\*(d-\-pF)] time and produces 0(|PF|-1-|Z?|) sentences
of size 0{\D\ * (dpF)). •
Note that if the disjunction-free default theory is acyclic, then it can be
compiled into a propositional theory in linear time.
Combining Proposition 5.7 and Corollaries 5.3-5.5 we get the following
results on the complexity of the class 2-DT:
Corollary 5.9 The coherence problem (i.e. extension existence) for the
class 2-DT is NP-complete.
Corollary 5.10 The membership problem for the class 2-DTis NP-complete.
Corollary 5.11 The entailment problem for the class 2-DT is co-NP-complete.
6 Tractable Subsets for Default Logic
Once queries on a default theory are reduced to prepositional satisfiability,
we can use any of a number of techniques and heuristics to answer them.
For instance, entailment in default logic can be solved using any complete
resolution technique, since we have shown that it is reducible to entailment
in prepositional logic.
Our approach is useful especially for the class 2-DT, since our algorithm
compiles a2-DT in polynomial time. So if a2-DT translates into an easy sat
isfiability problem, queries on the knowledge it represents can be answered
efficiently. In other words, each subclass of 2-DT that translates into a
tractable subclass of propositional satisfiability is a tractable subset for de
fault logic. So we can identify easy default theories by analyzing the charac
teristics of 2-DT that would translate into tractable propositional theories.
We will give an example of such a process by showing how some techniques
developed by the constraints based reasoning commumty cdun be used to iden
tify new tractable subsets for default logic.
Constraint-based reasoning is a paradigm for formulating knowledge in
terms of a set of constraints on some entities, without specifying methods
for satisfying such constraints. Some techniques for testing the satisfiability
of such constraints, and for finding a setting that will satisfy all the con
straints specified, exploit the structure of the problem through the notion of
a constraint graph.
The problem of the satisfiability of a propositional theory can be also
formulated as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). For a propositional
theory, the constraint graph associates a node with each propositional letter
and connects any two nodes whose associated letters appear in the same
propositional sentence.
Various parameters of constraints graph were shown as crucially related to
the complexity of solving CSP and hence to solving the satisfiability problem.
These include the induced width, uj", the size of the cycle-cutset, the depth
of a depth-first-search spanning tree of this graph, and the size of the non-
separable components ([Fre85j),[DP88], [Dec90]). It can be shown that the
worst-case complexity of deciding consistency is polynomially bounded by
any one of these parameters. Since these parameters can be bounded easily
by asimple processing of the graph, they can be used for assessing complexity
ahead of time. For instance, when the constraint graph is a tree, satisfiability
can be answered in linear time.
In the sequel we will focus on two specific CSP techniques; tree-clustering
[DP89], which we will describe in detail, and cycle-cutset decomposition
[Dec90]. which we will discuss briefly.
6.1 Tree-clustering for default theories
We will show how tree-clustering can be used in default reasoning in two
steps; we will show first how this technique can be used to solve satisfiability
and then how it can beadopted for answering queries about a default theory.
The tree-clustering scheme has a tree-building phase and a query-processing
phase. The complexity of the former is exponentially dependent on the
sparseness ofthe constraint graph, while the complexity ofthelatter is always
linear in the size of the database generated by the tree-building preprocessing
phase. Consequently, even when building the tree is computationally expen
sive, it may bejustified when the size of the resulting tree is manageable and
many queries on the same theory are expected. The algorithm is summa
rized in Figure 4. It uses the triangulation algorithm, which transforms any
graph into a chordal" graph by adding edges to it [TY84]. The triangulation
algorithm consists of two steps;
1. Select an ordering for the nodes (various heuristics for good orderings
are available).
2. Fill in edges recursively between any two nonadjacent nodes that are
connected via nodes higher up in the ordering.
Since the most costly operation within the tree-building algorithm is gen
erating all the submodels of each clique (step 5), the time and space com
plexity of this preliminary phase is 0(\T\ *n *2'^'), where |C| is the size of
the largest clique, |r| the size of the theory and n is the number of letters
used in T. It can be shown that \C\ = to' H- 1, where w* is the width of
the ordered chordal graph (also called induced width). As a result, for classes
having a bounded induced width, this method is tractable.
A graph is chordal if every cycle of length at least four has a chord.
^^The width ofa node in an ordered graph is the number ofedges connecting it to nodes
lower in the ordering. The width of an ordering is the maximum width of nodes in that
ordering, and the width of a graph is the minimal width of all its orderings
Tree building(r, G)
input: A prepositional theory T and its constraint graph G.
output: A tree representation of all the models of T.
1. Use the triangulation algorithm to generate a chorda] constraint graph.
2. Identify all the maximal cliques in the graph. Let Gi,...,C, be all such
cliques indexed by the rank of their highest nodes.
3. Connect each G; to an ancestor Cj (j < i) with whom it shares the
largest set of letters. The resulting graph is called a join tree.
4. Compute Mi, the set of models over Ci that satisfy the set of all sen
tences from T composed only of letters in Ci.
5. For each Ci and for each Cj adjacent to Ci in the join tree, delete from
Mi every model M that has no model in Mj that agrees with it on the
set of their common letters (this amounts to performing arc conaisitncy
on the join tree). •
Figure 4: Propositional-tree-clustering:Tree-building phase
Once the tree is built it always allows an efficient query-answering process,
that is, the cost ofanswering many types ofqueries is linear in the size of the
tree generated. The query-processing phase is described below (m bounds
the number of submodels for each clique):
Propositional Tree-Clustering - Query Processing
1. T is satisfiable if none of its .Vf,"s is empty, a property that can be
checked in 0{n).
2. To see whether there is a model in which some letter P is true ( false),
we arbitrarily select a clique containing P and test whether one of
its models satisfies (does not satisfy) P. This amounts to scanning a
column in a table, and thus will be linear in m. To check whether a
set of letters A is satisfied by some common model, we test whether all
the letters belong to one cluster C,. If so, we check whether there is
a model in Mi that satisfies A. Otherwise, if the letters are scattered
over several cliques, we temporarily eliminate from each such clique
all models that disagree with A, and then reapply arc consistency. A
model satisfying Aexists iff none ofthe resulting becomes empty.
The complexity of this step is 0{n »m * logm). •
We next summarize how tree-clustering can be applied to default reason
ing (now n stands for the number ofsymbols in the default theory, m for the
number of submodels in each clique; note that m is bounded by the number
of the extensions that the theory has):
1. Translate the 2-DT to propositional logic (generates O(n^) sentences
of size 0{dc * (d + nP)).
2. Build a default database from the propositional sentences using the
tree-building method (takes 0{\T\n'^ * exp(u;* + 1)), where |r| is the
size of the theory generated at step 1).
3. Answer queries on the default theory using the produced tree:
(a) To answer whether there is an extension, test whether there is an
empty clique. If so, no extension exists (bounded by 0(rP) steps).
(b) To find an extension, solve the tree in a b<u:ktrack-free manner:
In order to find a satisfying model we pick an arbitrary node Ci in
the join tree, select a model A/, from Mi, select from each of its
neighbors Cj a model Mj that agrees with M,- on common letters,
unite all these models, and continue to the neighbors's neighbors,
and so on. The set of all models can be generated by exhausting
all combinations of submodels that agree on their common letters
(finding one model is bounded by 0(n^ * m) steps).
(c) To answer whether there is an extension that satisfies a clause c
of size k, check whether there is a model satisfying [^c'ccc'er^c'l
(this takes 0{k^ * * m * logm) steps). To answer whether c is
included in all the extensions, check whether there is a solution
that satisfies [^c'ccc'6T~'^ c'] ('mounded by 0{k^n^m) steps).
As was stated before, given a default theory A and a closure of A, 5, the
complexity of the algorithm presented above depends on the topology of the
constraint graph of the prepositional theory g. One of the advantages of
the algorithm we suggest is that it is possible to asses the cost of the whole
process by examining the default theory prior to the translation step. We
are able to show a characterization of the tractability of default theories as
a function of the topology of their interaction graph.
The interaction graph is an undirected graph where each clause in S is
associated with a node. Arcs are added such that for every default
Ci, .... Cti . 1 •••1
therearearcs connecting Co,Ci Cn,CNF{-^dn+i),CNF{-^dn+n) ina clique;
every two clauses c, c' are connected iff c C or if there exist cf' such that
c = re3(cf,c'').
The next theorem characterizes the complexity of our algorithm in terms
of the induced width of the interaction graph.
Theorem 6.1 For a 2-DT A whose interaction graph has an induced width
w', existence, membership, and entailment can be decided in 0(n^ * (n +
2^ +i)_|. |£)| *(i) steps when the theory is acyclic and 0(n^(n^ + n + /^) +
\D\ * (d-\- pP)) steps when the theory is cyclic. •
Note that an upper bound to w* is 2n^ and that the upper bound isalways
at least as large as the size of the largest default in the theory. We believe,
however, that this algorithm is especially useful for temporal reasoning in
default logic, where the temporal persistence principal causes the knowledge
base to have a repetitive structure, as the following example demonstrates:
Example 6.2
Suppose I park my car in the parking lot at time ti. If it was not removed
from the lot by being stolen or towed between time and I expect my
car to be there during any time U between ti and This can be formalized
in the following default theory, where we have n defaults of the form
parked(^) : parked{i,+i)
parked(ii+i)
and in W we have n sentences for each of the forms:
stolen{<j) —
towed-away(i,
moved (i,) —*
moved(<,)
—> moved{ti)
parked(<,+i)
For notational convenience, we abbreviate the above rules as follows:
ptj : pii+\
PU+i
st,—*mti
tt,—>mti
mti—
The interaction graph of this theory for the closure { pf,-, -.p<,-,
~'Tnti V~'pti^ Vmf,, Vmf, } is shown in Figure 5. If we use the
ordering shown in the figure, we find that w* < 2 for this particular set of
problems. Thus, as the number of time slots (n) grows, the time complexity
for answering queries about coherence, set-membership, and set-entailment
using the iTee-clustering method grows linearly. Note that according to Sel-
man and Kautz's classification [KS91], this family of theories belongs to a
class for which the complexity of answering such queries is NP-hard.
ft.
« ^ a
Figure 5: Constraints graph for Example 6.1
6.2 Cycle-cutset for default theories
The cycle-cutset algorithm is another method for solving CSPs that exploits
special features of the constraint graph. The cycle-cutset method is based
on two facts: that tree-structured CSPs can be solved in linear time, and
that variable instantiation changes the effective connectivity of the constraint
graph. The basic idea is to instantiate a set of variables that constitute a
cycle-cutset of the constraint graph, where a cycle-cutset is a set of nodes
that, once removed, render the graph cycle-free. After the cycle-cutset is
instantiated, the remaining graph is a tree, and we can apply the linear-time
tree algorithm for solving the rest of the problem. If no solution is found,
we have to try another instantiation of the cycle-cutset variables, and so on.
Clearly, the complexity of this approach is exponentially bounded by the size
of the cycle-cutset that is used. For more details on this method, see [Dec90].
We have the following complexity bound on reasoning tasks in 2-DT:
Theorem 6.3 For a 2-DT whose interaction graph has a cycle-cutset ofcar
dinality c, existence, membership, and entailment can be decided in 0(n^ ♦
(n -I- 2^) -I- \D\ ♦ d) steps when the theory is acyclic and 0{n^{n*^ + n -p /') -f
\D\ * {dpF)) steps when the theory is cyclic. •
7 Conclusions
Reiter's default logic isa useful formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning. How
ever, the usefulness ofdefault logic is limited by the lackof intuitive semantics
for the setofconclusions that the logic ratifies and by the high computational
complexity required for drawing such conclusions.
In this paper we have addressed some of the these problems. We have
presented a new semantics for default logic which clarifies the concept of
extension, have shown a procedure that computes an extension for any fi
nite prepositional default theory, and have identified new tractable default
theories.
Using the concept of meta-interpretations, we defined a model for a prepo
sitional default theory. We then showed an algorithm that compiles any finite
default theory into a classical prepositional theory such that models of the
last coincide with extensions of the first. This means that queries on de
fault theories are reducible to prepositional satisfiability, a problem that has
been largely explored. For instance, in order to compute whether a formula
is in every extension of a default theory, we need not compute or count all
the extensions, since the problem of entailment in default logic is reduced to
propositional provability.
In general, the translation algorithm is exponential, but it is polynomial
for the class 2-DT which is expressive enough to embed inheritance networks
and logic programs. This leads to the observation that Membership and
Coherence is NP-complete and Entailment is co-NP-complete for the class
2-DT. Using constraint satisfaction techniques, we have identified tractable
subclasses of 2-DT. We have shown how problems in temporal reasoning can
be solved efficiently using the tree clustering cilgorithm.
Related results for autoepistemic logic were reported in [MT91], where it
was shown that the question of an atom's membership in every expansion of
an autoepistemic theory can be reduced to propositional provability. Also,
Elkan [Elk90] has shown that stable models of a logic program with no clas
sical negation can be represented as models of propositional logic, thus our
work extends his results for the full power of default logic.
There have been attempts in the past to relate default logic to other forms
of nonmonotonic reasoning systems, such cis autoepistemic logic, circumscrip
tion, and TMS [Kon88, MTS9, Eth87b, JK90]. We believe that embedding
default logic in classical logic is just as valuable since classical logic is a
very well-understood formalism supported by a large body of computational
knowledge.
8 Proofs
8.1 Useful theorems and definitions
Definition 8.1 ([tL67]) If S is any set ofclauses, then the resolution ofS,
denoted by R{S), is the set consisting of the members of S together with all
the resolvents of the pairs of members of S. •
Definition 8.2 ([tL67]) If S is any set of clauses, then the n-th resolution
ofS, denoted by R^{S), is defined /or n > 0 as follows: BP = S, and for
n>0, = R{R^{S)). •
Theorem 8.3 ([tL67]) Given a set S of clauses, if a clause c w a logical
consequence^^ of S, then for some n > 0. there exist a clause d € RI*{S),
such that c' C c. •
Proposition 8.4 Suppose c,ci,C2,c;,4 are clauses, cj C ci, C ca, and
c —res{ci,C2). Then at least one of the following conditions must hold:
1. c; C c.
2. d^Cc.
3. There is d C c such that d 6 re5(c'i,c^).
Proof: Suppose
Ci = C3 V P
C2 = C4 V ~'P
c = C3 V C4
and suppose conditions 1 and 2 do not hold. Then it must be that
c'l = C5 V P
4 = Ce V --P
where cs is a subset of C3 and ce is a subset ofof C4. Clearly, cj Vce is both
a resolvent of cj and and a subset of c. •
assume c is not a tautology.
Corollary 8.5 Ifa meta-interpretation is deductively closed, then if it sat
isfies Ci,C2. it must also satisfy res(ci,C2). •
Theorem 8.6 ([ReiSO], Corollary I>.2) .4 closed default theory {D,W) has
an inconsistent extension iffW is inconsistent. •
Proposition 8.7 Let 9 be a deductively closed meta-interpretation, and sup
pose 9 satisfies a set of clauses .4. and A |= c. Then 9 satisfies c.
Proof: By Theorem 8.3, there is i such that for some d 6 c' C c. We
will prove by induction on this ^that 9^ c', and hence 9satisfies c. For i=0,
the assertion is clear. For i > 1, there must be Ci,C2 € such that
d = res(ci,C2). By the induction hypothesis, 9 satisfies Ci and 03. So by
Corollary 8.5, 9 satisfies d. •
8.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.7 (prime(A) is a closure) Let A be a default
theory. prime(A) is a closure of A.
Proof: Suppose E is an extension of A = (D,W), By Definition l.I,
for some ordering, E = where Ei is as defined there. We will
show that for each c e E, there is a clause d in prime(A) such that
^ c- The proof will go by induction on mm(c), where min{c) is the
minimal i such that c €
Case inin{c) = 0: In this case, it must be that c e W, and our claim
must be true since prime(A) contains PI{W).
Case min{c) = 1: In this case, it must be that either W cor c € Co
in any case, the assertion clearly holds.
Assume the claim is true for min{c) = n, where n > 0, show that
it is true for m = n + l(m>l). From now on we assume that
c ^ A, since by Lemma 8.6, if c = Athen c6 P/(W), so min(A)
must be < 1.
Suppose cwas introduced first at Em- So either c € Co or £„ (= c.
If c € Co, then clearly our assertion holds. Assume £„ c.
So by Theorem 8.3, for some there is d' e R'{En) such that
d' C c. We will show by induction on such a minimal j that there
is d 6 pnme(A} such that d C c. For j = 0, this is clear due
to the induction hypothesis on n. For j > 0, let ci.cj be clauses
in /?'(£„), / < j, such that d' 6 res(ci,C2). By the induction
hypothesis, there are d^, Cj in prime(A) such that d^ Qa, d^C cj.
By Proposition S.4, either d^ C d' or c/j C d' or there is cg in
res(c'i,C2) such that C3 C d\ Since min{c) > 1, it can't be that
both c'l and 4 are in Pl{\V), so C3 G/?(A) -AC prime(A). •
Proof of Theorem 3.16 (model-extension) Let A be a default theory.
A theory E is an extension for A iff there is a model 0 for A such that
E= •
Proof: Let A = (D, W) be a default theory and 0 = (S, /) a model of
A. Let A be the set of all clauses that 9 satisfies. We will show that A
is an extension^"* of A.
We define
1. Eo = W,
2. For i > 0 Ei+i = E'{J {c|q: : G D where a G and
^ A and c G A}, and
3.
It is easy to verify that £ C A. We will show that ACE, and so by
Theorem 1.1 A is an extension of A.
Let c G A. By definition, c has a proof w.r.t. (S,/) and A. By
induction on the number of defaults used in the shortest proof, we can
easily show that c G
To prove the other direction, suppose E is an extension of A. We will
show that 9 = (5,/') is a model of A, where /' is defined as
for all c G S,/'(c) = true«S=>'C G E.
It is easy to verify that 9 is deductively closed and satisfies A. By
Theorem 1.1, there are sets Eo, Ei,... such that
1. Eo = W,
we assume in this proof that an extension is a set of clauses.
2. For i > 0 Ei+i - [J {c|a : /3„/c 6 D where a e Ei and
i E], and
3. £ = U:^o^.-
By induction on the minimal i such that an arbitrary clause c belongs
to we can show that c has a proof in 0 and that $ is based on A. •
Proof of Theorem 3.18 (indexing and proofs) Aweak models = (S,/ )
for A is a model iff there is a function p : S—such that for each
atomic clause c the following conditions hold:
1. c 6 W iff p(c) = 0.
2. li c^W then at least one of the following conditions hold:
(a) There is a default <5 = q : /3„/c GD such that 9 satisfies
o and does not satisfy any of and, for all ci 6 CNF(a),
there is an atomic clause C2 Ccl such that p(c2) < p(c).
(b) There are two atomic clauses c\ and cj such that c is a resol
vent of Cl and cj. 6satisfies ci and C2, and p(ci),p(c2) < p(c).
(c) There is c' Cc such that 9^ d and p(d) < p(c).
Proof: We can show that each atomic clause has a proof w.r.t. 9 and
A by induction on p(c). •
Proof ofTheorem 3.20 (models for acyclic theories) U9 = (S,/) is
a weak model for an acyclic default theory A, then ^ is a model for A.
Proof. If the theory is acyclic, the dependency graph induces on S an
ordering that complies with the requirements stated in Theorem 3 18
•
Proof of Theorem 3.22 (minimality of models) Amodel for Ais a min
imal weak model for A.
Suppose that 9 = (S,/ ) is a model for A. It is obviously a weak
model. We want to show that it is minimal. By definition, for each
atomic clause c in S there is a proof of c w.r.t. 9 and A. Assume by
contradiction that 9 is not minimal. So there must be a weak model
—(S./') such that .4 C -4. where
A~ = {c|c is atomic,/'(c) = true}
.4 = {c|c is atomic, / (c) = true)
We will show that if c has a proof w.r.t. A and 0, it must be satis
fied by 0', and so A C A~ —a contradiction. The proof will go by
induction on n, the number ofdefaults used in the proof of c. If n = 0,
the assertion is clear since c 6 W'. In case the proof of c uses the
defaults ^i,we observe, using the induction hypothesis, that
(WU{concl(<5i),...,concl(<5n)})" is satisfied by 0'. So since 0' must sat
isfy A, it must satisfy concl(^,i+i) ^ well, and since it is deductively
closed, it must satisfy WU{concl(6i),...,concl(5„+i)}*, so it satisfies c.
•
A Expressing Indexes in Prepositional Logic
Suppose we are given a set of symbols L to each of which we want to assign
an index variable within the range I —m.
We define a new set of symbols: L' = {P,P = 1,P = 2,P ~ m\P € L},
where P = t for i = denote prepositional letters with the intuition
"P will get the number i" behind it. For each P in let Np be the following
set of sentences :
P = lVP = 2V...VP = m
P = 1—.[-(P = 2) A-(P = 3) A... A-(P = m)]
p = 2—>h(P = 3)A-(P = 4) A... A-(P = m)]
P = m —1—•-'(P = m).
The set Np simply states that p must be assigned one and only one
number.
For each P and Q in C\ let [#P < #g], which intuitively means "The
number of P is less than the number of Q'\ denote the disjunction of the
following set of sentences:
p = 1 Ag = 2, p = 1A g = 3 p = 1A g = m
P = 2Ag = 3....,P = 2Ag = m
P = m —lAg = m.
Thus, for each symbol P to which we want to assign an index, we add
Np to the theory, and then we can use the notation [#P < #gj to express
the order between indexes.
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